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Abstract
Throughout the world, strong dispersions of both regional and national
unemployment rates can be observed. The economic theory has developed
various explanations on how this diﬀerences occur. Corresponding models
mainly aim at institutional and political framework, insider eﬀects, eﬃ-
ciency wages, collective bargaining and cyclical eﬀects. However, the size
of economies has received little attention in this discussion.
In this paper, we will show that there is indeed a strong link between
size and unemployment. Using data from 37 countries, 15 continents and
trade areas as well as 496 federal states, we will demonstrate that larger
economic regions tend to have higher unemployment rates.
Subsequently, we show that this correlation is strongly determined by
the degree of centralization of countries. Based on these ﬁndings, we
develop a model that explains regional and national unemployment using
size and centralization. We will point out that centralization parabolas
can be derived for each country. These curves are strongly inﬂuenced by
the size of economies in a way that diﬀerent sizes lead to a shift of the
parabolas. As we will demonstrate, country-speciﬁc parabolas explain the
strong dispersion of unemployment rates quite accurately.
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JEL No.: J64, J08, R10, F00
Adress: Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre
insbesondere Wirtschaftsordnung und Sozialpolitik
Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg
97070 Würzburg
tel. no.: (49) 931 31 84588
e-mail: klaus.gruendler@uni-wuerzburg.de
11 Introduction
In most developed countries, strong dispersions of regional unemployment rates
can be stated. The standard deviation of regional unemployment rates in Ger-
many was 3.3%-points in 2010. This eﬀect can be observed in many industri-
alized countries like the United States (1.3 %-points), Japan (4.3 %-points),
France (2.0 %-points), the United Kingdom (1.3 %-points) and Canada (3.2 %-
points). However, this phenomenon does not only hold for intra-national levels.
Intra-continental views reveal even stronger diﬀerences, particularly in Africa
(standard deviation: 8.8 %-points), Asia (3.1 %-points) and North America (4.1
%-points). With some 2.3 %-points, the EU-15 show the lowest diﬀusion on the
continental scale.
Since the early 1970s when European unemployment rates rose sharply, the
determinants of unemployment led to an intense discussion among economists.
It is indisputable that exogenous shocks leading to a decline in aggregate demand
have strong impacts on the level of employment. In addition, economists agree
that wages above the equilibrium level will cause unemployment. Furthermore,
the inﬂuence of collective bargaining, insider eﬀects and both institutional and
political framework is widely accepted.1
However, the inﬂuence of the size of nations has received little attention
in this discussion. Based on the EU-15 states, Neumann (2006) showed that
there is a signiﬁcant correlation between the surface area of European countries
and their unemployment rates. A similar presumption has been expressed by
Krugmann (2011) who discovered a strong link between the population of the
American federal states and the state speciﬁc level of unemployment in Decem-
ber 2010. Nevertheless, to date, this eﬀect has solely been studied on the basis of
few observations. Thus, no statements concerning the general interdependencies
between size and unemployment are possible so far.
In this paper, we will examine that link on a broad basis. Chapter 2 ﬁrst ex-
plains our empirical and methodological approaches and presents the data used.
In chapter 3, we derive the theoretical link between size and unemployment us-
ing a Cobb-Douglas production function and demonstrate that this correlation
basically has to be positive. Chapter 4 provides an overview of the status quo
of the synchronization between size and unemployment on the international
as well as the intra-national level. Furthermore, we will identify the need to
derive long-term cyclically-adjusted unemployment rates, since cyclical eﬀects
1A detailed overview on the state of research is provided by Blanchard, O. (2006).
2took huge impacts on the correlation. Using this smoothed rates, we calculate
equilibrium coeﬃcients for 35 countries as well as for 15 trade areas and con-
tinents. As we will show, the correlation between size and unemployment is
indeed positive in most cases, albeit some countries deviate from this general
rule.
In chapter 5, we wish to answer why some of the countries in the sample
reveal negative correlation coeﬃcients. Our ﬁndings indicate that the rela-
tionship between size and unemployment is largely inﬂuenced by the agregate
degree of centralization, deﬁned as the product of tariﬀ and ﬁscal centralization.
Concretely, size inﬂuences unemployment rates negatively whenever nations are
strongly decentralized.
In chapter 6, we show how regional and national unemployment can be
modeled using the aggregate level of centralization and our derived relationship
between size and unemployment rates. We will demonstrate that each country
has its own centralization parabola which has strong similarities to the proposed
hypothesis of Calmfors and Driﬃll (1988). However, these parabolas are inﬂu-
enced by the size of the underlying economies, since diﬀerent sizes lead to shifts
of the parabolas. In consequence, the inﬂuence of size may add one missing piece
to the hypothesis of Calmfors and Driﬃll, since their hump-shape assumption
can hitherto not explain one phenomenon that we can empirically observe quite
often: that countries with the same degree of centralization in several cases have
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent unemployment rates.
2 Data and methodological approach
In chapter 4, we will examine the linear synchronization between size and un-
employment on both the intranational and the international level. We will
therefore split up various economic regions into subgroups and measure the lin-
ear correlation within these groups. At the intranational level, country j will
be divided into its federal states i = 1;:::;n. At the international level, we will
split up continents and trade areas k into j = 1;...;m countries.
In order to deﬁne comparable federal states for each country, the NUTS
classiﬁcation of Eurostat will be used. The NUTS code divides all EU member
states, candidate countries and EFTA states into homogeneous and internation-
ally contrastable administrative districts. In addition, due to NUTS being based
on the internationally accepted standard ISO-3166, international comparisons
3with countries outside Europe are possible.2
NUTS structures national states on six diﬀerent levels (NUTS 0-3 and LAU
1-2). In this paper, we mainly use the NUTS 1 and NUTS 2 codes which reﬂect
lager regions with 3-7 million (NUTS 1) respectively 800.000-3 million (NUTS 2)
inhabitants. For most countries, n is suﬃciently large enough to allow cautious
statements about the correlation of size and unemployment by using NUTS 1
and NUTS 2. Yet, in some cases n falls below the critical level of n = 5. In
this situation, we deviate to NUTS 3. Due to the heterogeneity of the size of
European countries, a consideration on a consistent NUTS level does not seem
to be operational. Owing to the small number of cases, Iceland, Liechtenstein,
Luxembourg, Malta, Macedonia and Cyprus could not be included into the
study.
For states outside Europe, we use the TL-2 classiﬁcation of the OECD,
which coincides largely with the NUTS codes. TL-2 codes are available for
Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, South Korea, Turkey and the
United States. Countries outside the NUTS and the TL-2 categorization, such
as China, Russia or India, will be disposed by using the classiﬁcation of the
particular census bureaus. Table A1 in the appendix shows the classiﬁcations
used and the respective number of cases for each country.
We deﬁne the size of the region i by both its area in square kilometers (SQi)
and its population (Li). The unemployment rate will be denoted by !i and
reﬂects the unemployment of people over 15 as measured by Eurostat (data
code Y_GE15). For countries that are not covered by Eurostat, we use data
from the International Labor Organization (ILO).
In order to determine the synchronization of size and unemployment, we
use the correlation coeﬃcient according to Pearson and Bravais. Since the
classiﬁcation of subregions employing NUTS and TL-2 leads to a relatively small
sample sizes for the particular countries j, we use the correlation coeﬃcient
instead of regression analysis to get a general idea of the coherence between
size and unemployment in j. As a matter of course, these coeﬃcients must be
interpreted with caution, owing to the low degrees of freedom.
Let SQj = (SQ1;:::;SQi;:::;SQn) be the vector of the area of all subregions
i in j and !j = (!1;:::;!i;:::;!n) be the vector of regional unemployment with
the same sequence, the correlation coeﬃcient j is given by








with covariance COV (SQj;!j) = E[(SQj   SQj)(!j   !j)] and variance
V AR(SQj) = E[(SQj   SQj)2] where  describes the mean of the particular
random variable.3
Similarly, j(L;!j) denotes the correlation of population and unemployment
on the international level. In this case, the corresponding coeﬃcients are marked
with the subscript k instead of j. Note that  only measures the linear coherence
of SQj and !j. For  !  1, SQj and !j are perfectly negative correlated, whilst
 ! 1 displays a completely positive relationship between SQj and wj.
Bearing in mind that the approach of chapter 4 is rather inadequate to derive
a general statement on the relationship between size and unemployment, we will
apply OLS models in order to evaluate the inﬂuence of size on the aggregate
level. This analysis will include all subregions i of the countries surveyed as well
as all countries j of our sample. We will therefore attain one regional as well as
one international estimation. Thus, the degrees of freedom are high enough to
allow a general statement on the inﬂuence of size using OLS.
We will demonstrate that j relies heavily on the aggregated national degree
of centralization, deﬁned as the multiplicative combination between the ﬁscal
and the tariﬀ centralization level. Hence, we will include this link in our OLS
analysis. For the degree of centralization, the tariﬀ data from the ICTWSS
Database of the Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies (AIAS)
(2011) will be used. The series WCOORD in the database prescinds the dom-
inant centralization level for each country. We will use three general levels of
centralization: wage coordination on company level (1), industry level (2) and
central level (3). The tariﬀ degree of centralization will therefore be a trinary
variable. For the ﬁscal centralization degree, we use data of the OECD (2011b)
that reﬂect the ratio of tax payments collected by the central government in
contrast to the general tax amount. To eliminate short-term ﬂuctuations, we
adopt the arithmetic mean between 2000 and 2010. Table A2 in the appendix
shows the characteristics of both centralization levels for the observation period
between 1995 and 2010.
3For a detailed review of the correlation coeﬃcient of Pearson and Bravais see Rodgers and
Nicewander (1988).
53 The theoretical link between unemployment
and size
The theoretical link between size and unemployment can be derived by using
an adjusted Cobb-Douglas production function. Let Y P be the Cobb-Douglas
function in its original form
Y P = AKL1  (1)
where 2(0, 1) denotes the elasticity of production, K entitles capital, L denom-
inates labor and A labels total factor productivity. Equation (1) has positive
and decreasing marginal productivities @Y
P
@K > 0 and @
2Y
P
@K2 < 0 8K > 0;L > 0
and furthermore has constant returns to scale with respect to positive scalars
, that is Y P(K;L) = Y P(K;L)8 > 0.

























= 0, satisfying the INADA
conditions.
By redeﬁning L in (1) as population in place of labor, we can diﬀerentiate
between labor force N and work-seeker U, that sum up to the total population
L. Note that people in non-working-age and voluntarily unemployed persons
are not taken into account. By using N in (1) we get
Y = AKN1  (2)
At any time, a ratio of the total population is employed. Thus, the equation
above now pictures the actual production at a ﬁctive point in time instead of
the production potential, where N 2 (0;L) acts as a cyclical component. The
unemployment rate ! = U
L = 1   N
L is the quotient of work-seekers and total
population. By rearranging this relationship, we get
N = L(1   !)
.
using this equation in (2) we get
Y = K [L(1   !)]
1  A
6taking logs and rearranging gives
! = 1   exp





























































We mentioned before that  > 0. Thus,  always has to be positive. It is
therefore immediatley apparent that an increase in population L leads to a rise
of the unemployment rate !. However, as the unemployment rate is determined
by a variety of factors, deviations of this rule are easily possible. Nevertheless, in
general, we can assume a positive relationship between size and unemployment
if deﬁning size as population.
4 Empirical ﬁndings
In this chapter, we will evaluate the prediction of the previous section concerning
the relationship between size and unemployment. As described in chapter 2, we
will use the correlation coeﬃcient of Bravais and Pearson, owing to the small
amount of subregions in j respectively k. Tables 1 and 2 show the correlation
coeﬃcients j(SQj;!j) and j(Lj;!j) for several industrialized nations between
1999 and 2009. Signiﬁcant coherences between size and unemployment can be
found in nearly every examined country. These correlations are particularly
strong in Germany, the UK, Turkey, South Korea and partly in the United
States and Mexico.
7Table 1: j;t(SQj;t;!j;t) for selected
industrialized nations between 1999 and 2009
j 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
Germany -.38 -.33 -.32 -.39 -.41 -.47
France -.24 -.03 -.29 -.28 -.34 -.09
United Kingdom -.57 -.59 -.77 -.84 -.56 -.51
Italy .23 .26 .23 .28 .26 .35
Turkey n.A. .15 .27 .31 .14 n.A.
Mexico -.26 -.31 -.21 -.09 -.27 -.13
Japan -.29 -.28 -.27 -.24 -.24 -.20
South Korea -.28 -.67 -.50 -.42 -.44 -.52
United States .25 .41 .32 .33 .23 .21
Data source: Eurostat (2011).
Table 2: j;t(Lj;t;!j;t) for selected
industrialized nations between 1999 and 2009
j 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
Germany -.52 -.49 -.49 -.51 -.50 -.50
France -.11 -.03 .07 .12 -.01 .08
United Kingdom -.50 -.44 -.15 -.03 -.19 n.A.
Italy .11 .12 .10 .12 .12 .11
Turkey n.A. .66 .47 .52 .71 n.A.
Mexico .44 .34 .32 .19 .22 n.A.
Japan -.22 -.29 -.30 -.28 -.30 n.A.
South Korea .79 .71 .81 .88 .85 n.A.
United States .13 .24 .36 .19 .29 .39
Data source: Eurostat (2011).
Given the results above, three basic conclusions can be drawn: ﬁrst, whilst
the correlation is high in most cases, we still ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the
strength of the co-movement. Second, our general assumption on the theoreti-
cal direction of the synchronization shows some empirical evidence, since most
numbers in table 2 are positive. Nevertheless, there are some deviations from
that rule (e.g. Japan and Germany). Third, the coeﬃcients tend to strongly
falter over time. In some cases, these ﬂuctuations can be neglected (e.g. in
8Japan), but mostly, they distort the picture signiﬁcantly.
Since SQj;t and Lj;t are virtually constant in the course of time, the ﬂuc-
tuations are triggered by the unemployment rate which is strongly sensitive to
cyclical developments. This can easily be shown using the example of Germany:
let YG;t be the price-adjusted chain-linked index of the German gross domestic
product at t, we can derive the economic cycle _ YG;t by eliminating the trend
in YG;t. Similarly, we can derive the correlation cycle _ G;t by detrending G;t.
Figure 1 plots both cycles over the period from 1995-2009.4
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Data source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2011) and table 2.
The graph shows that the correlation cycle follows the economic cycle with
some delay. Aside from the time-lag, the course of both curves is strikingly
identical. Table 3 shows the results of estimating _ G;t using lagged values of YG;t.
The ﬁndings indicate that the business cycle indeed has a strong impact on the
correlation coeﬃcient. As the columns (i) (iii) demonstrate, the determination
is particularly strong for a delay of three years. Model (ii) explains 98 percent of
the variance of the correlation cycle, whilst the marginal impact of the business
cycle is strongly signiﬁcant.
4We eliminated the trends in YG;t and G;t by using the polynomial PY = 86;1+1;3t and
Pr =  0;61 + 0;05t   0;003t2, where tn represents the n-th degree trend variable. We get
pt = :0000 and R2 = :91 for PY as well as pt = :00008tn and R2 = :84 for P.




















N 14 14 14
R2 .31 .98 .33
SEE .024 .004 .023
F   Stat 2 254*** 2+
Data source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2011) and table 2. Notes: Table reports
OLS-Regression, t values are shown in parantheses, *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.001, +p>.20,
SEE = standard error of regression.
It is obvious that the strong economic impact on the correlation coeﬃcient
must be eliminated in order to identify the stable relationship of size and un-
employment. Thus, we calculate cyclically adjusted unemployment rates e !i and
~ !j for all sub-regions i = 1;...;n respectively j = 1;:::;m. To extract the
cyclically component from the time series !i and !j, we use the proposed ﬁlter
from Hodrick and Prescott (1980). The cyclically adjusted time series ~ ! will
show the long-term trend around which the unemployment rates ﬂuctuate.5 It
therefore has strong similarities with the ’natural’ rate of unemployment, if the
trend owns a slight slope.6
5Let log(!i;t) be the logarithm of the unemployment rate at t, the desired trend component





(log(!i;t)   i;t)2 + 
T 1 X
t=2
[(i;t+1   i;t)   (i;t   i;t 1)]2
at a given smoothing parameter . The ﬁrst term of the equation above ensures the best pos-
sible ﬁt to the data, whereas the second term penalizes the variation of the trend component.
Thus, the time series is accretively smoothed for increasing values of . In order to obtain a
low grade, we set  = 5000.
6A gradient ! 0 would lead to an approximation to the arithmetic mean. However,
10Table 4: cyclically adjusted international equilibrium correlation coeﬃcients
Continent or trade area e k(SQk; e !k) e k(Lk; e !k) N
Africa .27 .43 45
COMESA .42 -.26 17
COMESSA .30 -.22 26
Asia .16 -.22 42
ASEAN .47 -.30 8
GAFTA .60 .37 16
Europe -.09 .22 38
EU27 .35 .25 27
EU15 .70 .50 15
EURO-17 .56 .36 17
South America .21 .29 12
MERCOSUR .44 .57 10
North America -.25 -.31 20
NAFTA .88 -.36 3
Oceania -.23 -.24 18
Data source: Eurostat (2011), OECD (2011), World Bank (2011), ILO (2011),
and national census bureaus.
Since the variables SQ and L are only marginally aﬀected by cyclical ﬂuctu-
ations, the adjusted correlation coeﬃcients ~ (SQ; ~ !) and ~ (L; ~ !) using ~ ! rather
than ! can be interpreted as the long-term equilibrium relationship between
size and unemployment. Tables 4 and 5 illustrate this correlation coeﬃcients
on the intra-national respectively the international level.
Based on the time-independent coeﬃcients, strong correlations for almost
all countries, continents and trading areas can be indentiﬁed. The results pic-
tured in table 4 also provide the recognition that in most cases, trade areas
have a particularly higher correlation than continents. For example, e k(SQ; e !)
of South America is .21, while the coeﬃcient for MERCOSUR assumes a par-
ticularly higher level (.44). The same coherences can be measured in Asia (.16
vs. .47 (ASEAN) and .60 (GAFTA)), Africa (.27 vs. .42 (COMESA) and .30
the slope is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in most cases. Calculating ~ ! on the basis of
T 1 PT
t=1 !t would hence distort the results. Nevertheless, owing to the trend component
i 6= 0, the long term equilibrium rates can change over long periods. Yet, since we use data
between 1999 and 2009, the equilibrium rates are quite stable in the medium time.
11Table 5: cyclically adjusted intra-national equilibrium correlation coeﬃcients


































New Zealand -.99 .99
Russia .77 -.61
Turkey .22 .62
Data source: Eurostat (2011), OECD (2011), World Bank (2011), ILO (2011),
and national census bureaus.
12(COMESSA)) as well as in Europe ( 0 vs. .35 (EU27), .70 (EU15) and .56
(EURO-17)).
Evaluating our hypothesis from chapter 3, we perceive that the correlation
indeed is positive in most cases: 22 of the 36 countries surveyed oﬀer a positive
coeﬃcient e j(L; e !). This also holds for the international comparison: 5 out of
8 trade areas possess a positive coherence of size and unemployment. However,
this proposal does not hold on the continental level. One possible explanation
of this deviation is the relationship that we derived above: trade areas tend
to exhibit weaker correlations than continents. Apparently, the correlation is
higher, the more homogeneous the examined economic region is. Since countries
in continents like Ozeania (n = 18) and North America (n = 20) are strongly
heterogeneous, the correlation can easiliy be distorted in a way that the direction
of the coherence reverses.
5 The relationship between ~ , the ﬁscal and the
tariﬀ degree of centralization
We learned from chapter 4 that we can indeed state a signiﬁcant link between
size and unemployment for most countries and trade areas. As theoretically
derived, this correlation is positive in most cases. In other words, smaller
economies have to struggle with unemployment in a much lesser extent. How-
ever, we could not yet explain why some countries have negative coeﬃcients.
Obviously, there are determinants that reverse the basically positive relationship
between size and unemployment.
Economists largely agree that institutions strongly aﬀect the level of unem-
ployment.7 Probably the most important determinant in terms of the insti-
tutional framework of labor markets is the degree of centralization.8 At this
juncture, we have to distinguish between the ﬁscal degree of centralization and
the level of centralization of collective bargaining. The ﬁscal degree of central-
ization shows to what extent ﬁscal resources are used on the central government
level, whilst the level of collective bargainig indicates on which level bargaining
talks are held. Calmfors and Driﬃll (1988) demonstrated that the tariﬀ level
has a signiﬁcant impact on the level of real wages and unemployment. This
7See inter alia Berthold (2001), Blanchard and Wolfers (1999), Flaig and Rottmann (2011)
as well as Caballero and Hammour (2000) for this argument.
8See inter alia Traxler (2003) and Haltiwanger et al. (2006).
13assumption known as the ’Calmfors-Driﬃll hypothesis’ or ’hump-shape hypoth-
esis’ is based on an inverse parabolic relationship between the two variables,
with the maximum real wage and the highest rate of unemployment reached at
the medium degree of centralization.
But why do particularly high respectively low degrees of centralization lead
to lower unemployment rates? The corporatist hypothesis of Bruno and Sachs
(1985) says that the more comprehensive an interest group is, the less can
it succeed to gain special advantages to the detriment of other social groups.
Central wage bargaining therefore reﬂect the overall economic consequences to
a much higher extent, what leads to the interest group acting as a general
welfare-maximizing actor. On the other side, the liberal-pluralist thesis of inter
alia Lindbeck (1993) stresses the importance of market forces. Leaving wage
negotiations to markets leads to more ﬂexibile structures and a reduction of
classical unemployment.9
The hump-shape hypothesis can be interpreted as a combination of both ap-
proaches: countries with high levels of decentralization succeed because of the
ﬂexibility gained by the market forces. On the other hand, strongly centralized
nations succeed due to the bargaining partners acting as a general welfare-
maximizing actor. However, countries whose degrees of centralization stuck
in the middle could neither beneﬁt from the positive eﬀects described by the
corporatist hypothesis nor from those postulated by the liberal-pluralist the-
sis. As a matter of fact, moderately centralized nations have to suﬀer higher
unemployment rates.
Hereinafter, we aim to explain the relationship between e j, the ﬁscal and
the collective degree of centralization. For the tariﬀ level of centralization (j),
we use data from the ICTWSS database of the AIAS (2011). We distinguish




> > > <
> > > :
1 CB on company level
2 CB on industry level
3 CB oncentral level
In addition, we deﬁne the ﬁscal level of centralization hj 2 (0;1] as the ratio
of the amount of taxes ﬂowing directly to the central government and the total
9See Fehn, R. (2002) for a more detailed explanation of the corporatist and the liberal-
pluralist thesis.
14tax revenues. To calculate this quotient, we use data from OECD (2011b).
To eliminate short-term ﬂuctuations as well as cyclical eﬀects, we apply the
arithmetic mean j = T 1
T X
t=1
j;t between 2000 and 2010. Table A2 in the
appendix shows the speciﬁcation of j and hj for all countries surveyed.
First, we have to clarify how these two factors interact. The economic intu-
ition would be that economies choose a combination of  and  that minimizes
the adjustment costs. If bargaining talks are held on the central level, the ﬁscal
degree of centralization has to be high in order to enable the state to cope with
the unemployment caused by the collective agreement. In this case, there are
some strong incentives for the state to act as a general welfare-maximizing ac-
tor. On the other hand, if barganing talks are held on the company level, this
necessity does not exist. Recapitulatory, a positive correlation between the two
variables can be expected.
Figure 2 shows the relationship between the ﬁscal and the collective degree
of centralization. The lines picture the respective mean values of the sample.
Apparently, the synchronization of the variables is rather weak, albeit a faint
positive correlation (15 percent) can be measured. According to our theory,
most observations have to be located in the ﬁrst or the third quadrant. As
ﬁgure 2 shows, 12 out of 21 observations follow this rule. However, a strong
concentration in the second quadrant can be stated, whereas only two coun-
tries are located in the fourth quadrant. Whilst the position of countries in
the fourth quadrant remains inexplicably, the high accumulation in the second
quadrant can be explained by the dynamics of the variables: as the ﬁscal de-
gree of centralization in most cases is (implicitly or explicitly) enshrined in the
Constitution of the countries, it is very diﬃcult to be changed. The degree of
collective bargaining, however, reveals some variation over the course of time.
Figure 2 therefore shows the snapshot of an adjustment process that is still not
ﬁnished. Nonetheless, the correlation between the ﬁscal degree of centralization
and the centralization of collective bargaining is currently rather weak. As a
consequence, estimating the eﬀects on unemployment or ~  solely on the basis of
one degree of centralization might distort the results signiﬁcantly.
We therefore use the multiplicative combination of the two centralization
levels jhj to estimate the correlation ~ (SQ; ~ !). This multiplicative composition
can be interpreted as the aggregate degree of centralization of an economy.
Theoretically, the domain is Dom() = f 2 R+j0    3g. However, the
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Data source: AIAS (2011), OECD (2011b).
empirical interval of all nations surveyed is  2 [0:36; 2:58]. Table 6 shows
the results of the OLS estimation for the years 2000 and 2010. To investigate
whether the product jj is a reasonable explanation feature, we also test for
the factors j and j separately.
One might argue that our estimation using a simple linear regression can
be biased due to the omitted variable problem. Though, as the sample size is
N = 21, conclusions must be drawn very cautiously, even in the univariate case.
Including further variables q would signiﬁcantly intensify this problem owing to
the loss of additional degrees of freedom. Yet, the omitted bias will be negligible
if limCov(;q) ! 0. Another problem might be the logical inconsistency since
~  2 [ 1;1] owns a bounded domain Dom(~ ) 6= 1. However, this is an inherent
problem of economic research, since the domains of the unemployment rate
Dom(!) = f! 2 R+j!  1g or the Gini coeﬃcient Dom(G) = fG 2 R+jG  1g
are similarly bounded.
Table 6 shows that the aggregate degree of centralization  strongly in-
ﬂuences e j(SQ; e !). Low degrees of centralization lead to negative coeﬃcients,
while increasing values of jhj lead to steadily rising expressions of e j(SQ; e !).
Moreover,  has a signiﬁcantly higher ability to explain ~  in comparison to the

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































17model using  apparently works best in approximating ~ . The intercept of the
estimated equation is -.63 in 2010, the marginal impact of centralization is .59.
Overall, the model describes the data relatively well: 37 percent of the variance
of ~  in 2000 (respectively 33 percent in 2010) can be explained by using the
aggregate degree of centralization. The probability of the model beeing insignif-
icant is lower than one percent. As table 6 shows, the eﬀect of centralization is
quite stable over time, although a slightly decreasing trend can be observed.
From a centralization level jj  1, ~  tends to be positive. Our ﬁndings
in this chapter can therefore be summarized as follows: size and unemployment
are essentially positive correlated. Exceptions to this rule are nations with a
low degree of centralization (jj < 1).
6 Explaining unemployment using size and de-
gree of centralization
The previous chapter showed that the strength of the link between size and
unemployment rises with increasing degrees of centralization. Yet, this ﬁnding
could as well be a hint that multi-colinearity between the degree of centralization
and size is high. In this chapter, we develop a model that accounts for both
the size eﬀect as well as the centralization eﬀect. So far, we only measured the
inﬂuence of size in j. The degrees of freedom have thus not been suﬃciently
large enough to allow OLS estimations. In the following, we wish to investigate
the inﬂuence of size on a broader level. The model derived in this chapter shall
therefore answer two crucial questions: (1) how exactly works the interplay
between size and centralization and (2) how does size inﬂuence unemployment
on a broad country-unspeciﬁc level?
To display the degree of centralization, we again use jhj. The concrete
speciﬁcation of our model is based upon an adjusted Calmfors-Driﬃll hypothesis.
Calmfors and Driﬃll examined a sample of 17 countries in the period between
1962 and 1985 and came to the conclusion that strongly centralized as well as
highly decentralized nations have to struggle with a lower rate of unemployment
in comparision to those having a mediocre degree of centralization.
The ﬁndings of Calmfors and Driﬃll have been discussed intensely during
the last two decades. Recent studies could in fact conﬁrm the hump-shape
18hypothesis with some restrictions.10 Nevertheless, the hump-shape hypothesis
fails for several countries when being evaluated empirically.
We adjust the Calmfors-Driﬃll hypothesis by using the aggregate level of
centralization jhj rather than j. In addition, we use the above derived posi-
tive relationship between unemployment and size by adding the size parameter
p
LSQ to our model. The parameter represents the square root of the product
of area and population. Therefore, the analysis will account for both corre-
lation between surface area and unemployment as well as coherences amongst
population and unemployment.
In order to obtain a preferably extensive sample, we include all federal states
s of the nations for which we can ﬁnd reliable data on ()j;t and !s;t between
1999 and 2009 and achieve the set Ms with jMsj = 496. Table A3 in the
appendix lists the countries whose federal states are included in the analysis.
In order to maximize comparability, we exclusively use NUTS-2 regions for
European nations as well as TL-3 regions for countries outside Europe. Every
federal state s 2 Ms has a degree of centralization hj that refers to the country
j to which the federal state belongs.11 To get an idea about the long-term
equilibrium relationship, we again use the smoothed unemployment rates ~ !s.
The higher amount of observations using regions leads to a fairly robust model.
We can summarize the above-described assumptions as follows




LSQs + s (3)
where the ﬁrst two terms after the intercept picture the Calmfor-Driﬃll hy-
pothesis and the second term accounts for the derived relationship between size
and unemployment. In order to contrast the size eﬀect from the hump-shape
impact, we name the size coeﬃcient . Tables 7 and 8 show the results of the
OLS estimation of (3) on both the intra-national level as previously described as
well as on the international level. Due to the strong heterogeneity of the size of
the countries surveyed, we use log(LSQj) in our country model.12 The results
10See inter alia Forni (2004). Forni added, that highly centralized nations in fact have
lower unemployment rates than moderately centralized economies. However, in contrast to
strongly decentralized countries, this result could only be achieved by above-average govern-
ment spendings.
11We use the subscript s in order to delimit the federal states included in the estimations of
this chapter from those of the previous chapters (i). Since we solely use NUTS-2 respectively
TL-3 regions, s and i are not identical.
12Each data transformation changes the relative distance between the individual observa-
tions. However, this smoothing eﬀect is stronger using logs instead of the square root. See
Osborne (2002) for a more detailed discussion of this matter. Since we mainly use NUTS-2
19in tables 7 and 8 distinguish between the whole sample and a restricted sample
that only includes countries inside Europe. Owing to the structural diﬀerences
between European countries and nations outside Europe, we include the dummy
variable EUR when applying (3) on the whole sample. EUR takes a value of 1
if the country is inside Europe, and 0 otherwise.
The results of estimating the model on the whole sample of regional data
are shown in column (ii) of table 7. They are surprisingly good, given the large
variety of regions in the sample. All the variables have the expected sign and are
furthermore signiﬁcant in nearly every case. In particular,  reveals a positive
expression in each of the four models and is highly signiﬁcant, as predicted
in the preceding chapters. The positive sign of ()s as well as the negative
sign of ()2
s conﬁrm the inverse parabolic coherence between unemployment
and aggregate centralization. In general, the model explains almost one third
of the variance of regional unemployment, whilst the probability of the model
being insigniﬁcant is lower than .01 percent. Column (i) reports the results of
estimation (3) on the restricted sample that includes solely European regions.
The results are similar to those from column (ii), althoug the signiﬁcance of the
model is slightly smaller. As our European dummy EUR indicates, there are
some major structural disparities between European and non-European states.
Nevertheless, our modeled relationship holds in both cases.
Table 8 indicates an even better ﬁt of our model on the international level.
Again, all the variables have the expected sign, they are highly signiﬁcant most
of the time, and they explain 70 percent of the variance of international un-
employment rates. Just as on the regional level, size inﬂuences unemployment
positively. The coeﬃcient  is profoundly signiﬁcant for all sample periods. Fur-
thermore, the hump-shape proposal can again be approved. The null hypothesis
of model-insigniﬁcance must be rejected at least at the 0.5 percent-level for all
sample periods. The comparison between the sample periods shows that the
results are fairly robust over time.
We can summarize our ﬁndings as follows: ﬁrst, size inﬂuences unemploy-
ment rates positively. Second, this positive correlation is highly signiﬁcant on
both the regional as well as the international level. Third, the adjusted hump-
shape hypothesis holds in each case and is signiﬁcant most of the time. Overall,
both size and centralization have a crucial inﬂuence on regional and national un-
and TL-3 regions, the dispersion of
p
LSQ on the regional level (coeﬃcient of variation: .73 )
is signiﬁcantly lower than on the national level (.91), where a strong heterogeneity of size can

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































22employment. However, it is essential to quantify this inﬂuence more in detail. As
shown in tables 7 and 8, ()j has an inverse parabolic impact on the unemploy-
ment rate. Nations that have an aggregate degree of centralization equal to the
global maximum of the parabola will ceteris paribus have to struggle with higher
unemployment. The global maximum of ~ !j with respect to ()j can be calcu-
lated solving argmax()j[ 11:68 + 6:74()j   3:54()2
j + :057log(LSQj)].13
It appears that unemployment is at its maximum in  = 1. With increasing
distance from that point, unemployment rates decrease in both directions due
to the parabolic curve of the hump-shape hypothesis. In the following, we will
call this derived parabola the ’centralization parabola’ 
(LSQj).
However, this parabola is relying heavily on the size of the underlying econ-
omy. For smaller economies, the parabola is shifted downwards, whereas the
parabola lies on a higher level regarding larger economies. The size of economies
therefore inﬂuences its unemployment rates in a way that it leads to a shift
of 
(LSQj). In consequence, each economy has its individual centralization
parabola 
(LSQj). The position of a nation on its parabola is determined by
its degree of centralization. In contrast, the position of the parabola 
(LSQj)
itself is inﬂuenced by the size of the economy. That means, even if two economies
have the same degree of centralization, unemployment rates could diﬀer due to
the diﬀerence in population or surface. On the other hand, two countries with
a comparable population can have strongly diﬀerent unemployment rates due
to their individual position on 
(LSQj). Our parabolas therefore deviate from
the Calmfors-Driﬃll hypothesis in its original form, where two countries with
identical degrees of centralization can only have an identical level of unemploy-
ment.
If correct, our hypothesis leads to direct implications on economic policy: to
a certain extent, large nations with a particularly high respectively low degree
of centralization can compensate for the size eﬀect. A supoptimal centralization
level harms small countries to a much lesser extent than large nations. However,
even small states have the potential to reduce unemployment by moving towards
the two optima at the edges of 
(LSQj). Figures 3-5 picture the positions
of several European states on their individual centralization parabola and the
resulting amount of unemployment.
13 This can easily be done by calculating the necessary

@ ~ !j








=  7:08 < 0

condition.
23We can state signiﬁcant improvement potentials for some of the countries
shown. Figure 3 illustrates the centralization parabolas for small European
countries. Although Switzerland and the Czech Republic operate on a more
elevated parabola, both countries are able to realize a lower unemployment rate
than Denmark, owing to their lower level of aggregate centralization (Switzer-
land: 0.40, Czech Republic: 0.41, Denmark: 1.3).
In addition, Denmark is almost precisely on the global maximum of 
(LSQj),
that is at ()j = 1, while Portugal has a slightly more desirable degree of cen-
tralization at 1.20, striving for the optimal point at the right edge of 
(LSQj).
However, the equilibrium unemployment rate in Denmark is signiﬁcantly lower
than in Portugal, since Denmark (5.4 million inhabitants; 43,000 square kilome-
ters) is particularly smaller than Portugal (10.6; 92,000). But the comparision
with Switzerland oﬀers the potential for Denmark to reduce its unemployment:
although Switzerland and Denmark are almost equal in size, the decentraliza-
tion in Switzerland (0.40) leads to a much lower equilibrium unemployment
rate. Denmark therefore could realize the potential to reduce unemployment by
centralizing or decentralizing wage negotiations. However, decentralizing would
be the better alternative: Forni (2004) showed that the positive eﬀects on un-
employment gained by a high degree of centralization can only be achieved by
above-average government spendings.
Similar conclusions can be made regarding ﬁgure 4 that shows centralization
parabolas for large European nations. Although France is larger than Germany
or the United Kingdom, its equilibrium unemployment rate is lower. Again,
the high degree of aggregate centralization in Germany and the United King-
dom aﬀects employment negatively. This example also provides some interesting
insights on the characteristics of j: even though the ﬁscal degree of centraliza-
tion in France is higher than in Germany (FRA = :40 vs. GER = :31), collec-
tive bargaining is much more decentralized. Consequently, the aggregate level
of centralization in France is signiﬁcantly lower than in Germany (FRA = :40
vs. GER = :93).14
Figure 5 illustrates the remarkableness of the size eﬀect on the position of

(LSQj). Compared with small European countries like Switzerland, Germany
and France are more or less similar in size. Diﬀerences in equilibrium unem-
ployment rates between these two countries are mainly triggered by the level of
14Although France has historically been highly centralized, it has imposed a form of inte-
grated decision making on lower levels of government during the past century. See Ashford
(1977) for a detailed discussion of the French political system.
24Figure 3: centralization parabolas 


















Data source: table 8, restricted sample of European countries.
Figure 4: centralization parabolas 















Data source: table 8, restricted sample of European countries.
Figure 5: size diﬀerences of centralization parabolas 
(LSQj) between small














Data source: table 8, restricted sample of European countries.
25centralization rather than by size eﬀects. However, the impact of size becomes
strongly signiﬁcant when comparing Germany or France with small countries.
Even if Germany reaches the optimal centralization level at the left edge of

(LSQj); its unemployment rate would not be smaller than the Finnish or the
Swiss.
7 Conclusions
We showed that there is a signiﬁcant link between size and unemployment. It
became clear that this correlation is positive in most cases, i.e. larger states
are struggling with higher average unemployment. Exceptions to this rule are
states with a very low degree of centralization. However, with increasing cen-
tralization levels, the probability of a positive co-movement continues to grow.
Looking at both the degree of centralization and the size of economies, indi-
vidual centralization parabolas can be derived, which document the interaction
between centralization, size and unemployment for each state.
Based on these parabolas, implications for national economic policies can
be obtained. For Germany, the centralization parabola reveals some potential
for improvement: the degree of centralization is close to the global maximum
()j = 1. The ﬁscal centralization level is .32 and ranks in the lower middle
of all countries surveyed. Still, Germany owns a high level of centralization in
terms of collective bargaining. According to our hypothesis illustrated in ﬁgure
3, decentralizing collective bargaining would lead to a reduction in German un-
employment. This necessity becomes apparent considering the size of Germany:
since Germany ranks at the 14th position of the world largest countries in terms
of population15, the centralization parabola lies on an elevated level. Germany
therefore has to struggle with a generally higher level of unemployment. But ac-
cording to the results in this paper, decentralizing can be considered a preferable
measure to antagonize the negative eﬀects emanating from the size of nations.
15This ranking was established based on data from World Bank (2011).
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28Appendix
Table A1: Classiﬁcations and numbers of cases
1. NUTS-Countries
country classiﬁcation n
Austria NUTS 2 9
Belgium NUTS 2 10
Bulgaria NUTS 2 6
Croatia NUTS 3 21
Czech NUTS 2 8
Denmark NUTS 2 5
Estonia NUTS 3 5
Finland NUTS 2 5
France NUTS 2 26
Germany NUTS 1 16
Greece NUTS 2 13
Hungary NUTS 2 7
Ireland NUTS 3 8
Latvia NUTS 3 6
Lithuana NUTS 3 10
Netherlands NUTS 2 12
Norway NUTS 2 7
Poland NUTS 2 16
Portugal NUTS 2 7
Romania NUTS 2 8
Sweden NUTS 2 8
Slovakia NUTS 3 8
Slovenia NUTS 3 12
Spain NUTS 2 19
Switzerland NUTS 2 7
Turkey NUTS 1 12







New Zealand* TL2 2
South Korea TL2 7
United States TL2 51
*Note that New Zealand has not been included in the international-level estimations of this paper
since the correlation coeﬃcient by deﬁnition has to be either 1 or -1 for n = 2. Nevertheless,




China National Census Bureau 28
India National Census Bureau 27
Russia National Census Bureau 8
30Table A2: Speciﬁcation of j and j
country j 1995 j 2000 j 2005 j 2010 j 2000-2010
Australia 1 1 1 1 .42
Austria 3 3 3 3 .53
Belgium 3 3 3 3 .48
Canada 1 1 1 1 .45
Denmark 2 3 2 2 .67
Finland 2 2 3 2 .52
France 1 1 1 1 .40
Germany 3 3 3 3 .31
Italy 3 3 3 3 .54
Japan 3 2 2 2 .36
Netherlands 3 3 3 3 .59
Norway 3 2 3 3 .86
Portugal 2 2 2 2 .60
Sweden 2 2 2 2 .56
Spain 2 2 3 3 .39
United Kingdom 1 1 1 1 .76
United States 1 1 1 1 .42
Source: OECD (2011b), AIAS (2011).
31Table A3: Nations and regions used in the estimations of tables 7 and 8
country classiﬁcation number of regions used in regional
estimation
Australia TL-3 60 no
Austria NUTS-2 9 yes
Belgium NUTS-2 11 yes
Canada TL-3 288 no
Czech Republic NUTS-2 8 yes
Denmark NUTS-2 5 yes
Finland NUTS-2 5 yes
France NUTS-2 26 yes
Germany NUTS-2 39 yes
Hungary NUTS-2 7 yes
Italy NUTS-2 21 yes
Japan TL-3 64 yes
Netherlands NUTS-2 12 yes
New Zealand TL-3 14 yes
Norway NUTS-2 7 yes
Poland NUTS-2 16 yes
Portugal NUTS-2 7 yes
South Korea TL-3 16 no
Sweden NUTS-2 8 yes
Switzerland NUTS-2 7 yes
Spain NUTS-2 19 yes
United Kingdom NUTS-2 37 yes
United States TL-3 179 yes
Source: OECD (2011b), AIAS (2011)
Notes: We use regional data of all countries shown in table above whenever we could ﬁnd
suﬃcient time series on regional unemployment rates on TL-3 respectively NUTS-2 level. Norway
is excluded from the restricted sample estimation in column 5 of table 9, due to its exceptionally
high degree of centralization in comparison to other European nations (Norway: 2.54; second
highest degree of centralization: Netherlands: 1.77). We also excluded island regions and regions
that are overseas territories such as French-Guyana (France) or the Canaries (Spain). Excluded
regions are not included in the number of regions as shown in Table A3.
32